



□ INTRODUCTION

America has now had military forces in Vietnam for six long years. In the last two years alone, the number of troops there has increased eight-fold. Vietnam, as Senator George McGovern pointed out recently, "is degenerating into a defeat for America whether we 'win' or 'lose' on the battlefield; indeed, the more complete our military conquest, the more tragic our real loss may become."

During 1966, the "doves" in congressional and high policy positions outlined an alternative to the strategy of escalation: stop the bombing of North Vietnam; move to a defensive position in South Vietnam; seek for a negotiated settlement with all parties, including the National Liberation Front. The Vietnam hearings held by Senator J. William Fulbright, featuring such figures as General James M. Gavin and George Kennan, made this position well known.

Despite the availability of this alternate strategy, the President continued to escalate the war with the result that, according to George D. Aiken of Vermont, dean of the Republican Senate delegation, "the Vietnam conflict has split this country to a depth and with an intensity not experienced within this century." This split was illustrated by the quarter-million people who demonstrated for peace in Spring 1967.

In the face of what Senator Thruston B. Morton termed "an unhealthy and unproductive war fever . . . mounting in the United States," a number of Senators and Congressmen continued to speak out against folly in Vietnam. As Senator Morton said, "Total military victory in Vietnam means total war with China, and I for one, believe that means total world holocaust." Yet America is moving dangerously close to that course today, and unless ordinary citizens take responsibility for altering that course, we may find ourselves caught up in the World War III that nobody wanted. This pamphlet presents many of the facts Americans need to know if they are to save their country from that disaster.

This pamphlet is based in large part on facts and analysis prepared early in 1967 by the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

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"A CRIME AND A SIN"

The Catholic laymen's weekly Commonweal editorialized December 23, 1966, "the outcome in Southeast Asia will make a difference. But not the decisive difference needed to justify a war which may last longer than any America has ever fought, employ more U.S. troops than in Korea, cost more than all the aid we have ever given to developing nations, drop more bombs than were used against the Japanese in World War II, and kill and maim far more Vietnamese than a Communist regime would have liquidated -- and still not promise a definite outcome. The disproportion between ends and means has grown so extreme, the consequent deformation of American foreign and domestic policy so radical, that the Christian cannot consider the Vietnam war merely a mistaken government measure to be amended eventually but tolerated meanwhile. The evil outweighs the good. This is an unjust war. The United States should get out." Indeed, what is being done in Vietnam, "despite the almost certain good intentions of those doing it, is a crime and a sin."



The \$25.2 billion of supplemental appropriations in 1966 and 1967 permitted serious and extensive escalation. An analysis of press reports and Department of Defense data in 1966 and early 1967 shows the following items of escalation:

- Over-all U.S. casualties rose from 1636 killed and 7645 wounded on January 1, 1966 to 6644 killed and 37,738 wounded on December 31, 1966. Up to late May, 1967 the total was 10,566 killed and 64,041 wounded, plus 2,088 non-combat dead.
- U.S. troops in Vietnam increased from 181,000 on January 1, 1966 to 389,000 on December 31, 1966 to 455,000 in late May, 1967, with many thousands more expected by the end of the year.

- U.S. ground forces assumed more and more initiative in search-and-destroy missions in Vietnam. In December 1966, U.S. forces began a push into the populous Mekong Delta region.
- U.S. air raids struck closer and closer to Hanoi, culminating on December 13-14 in raids in which U.S. bombs struck residential areas within the city limits for the first time. These raids have been repeated several times since that date.
- In April, 1967, North Vietnamese MIG airfields were bombed for the first time. If the North moves its MIG's into China, will U.S. planes pursue them over the border? The Administration has stated that it recognizes no air sanctuary, leaving this possibility open.
- Commenting editorially on the raids on airfields and North Vietnamese industrial targets, the New York Times said (April 29, 1967), "Many signs suggest that the broadened bombing reflects Administration frustration more than it does any coherent plan for ending the Vietnamese conflict."
- The Times continued, "Only a few days ago, as Senator Percy has pointed out, both the Pentagon and the State Department argued against bombing the airfields. They told his office that the MIG's would simply move to China, where, if pursued, a dangerous Chinese-American confrontation could result. They said that in two years only eleven American aircraft have been lost in MIG action."
- The presence of some 25,000 U.S. servicemen in Thailand -- double the number reported six months earlier -- was disclosed in July, 1966. There were 35,000 U.S. servicemen in Thailand by mid-May, 1967, and facilities for 100,000 were under construction or planned.
- B-52s raided North Vietnam for the first time. One million pounds of bombs were dropped in a single B-52 raid in North Vietnam on April 12, 1966.
- The demilitarized zone was bombed for the first time, and invaded by ground troops in May, 1967.

- The presence of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines off the North Vietnam coast was disclosed.
- U.S. naval units extended operations to the North Vietnam coast, attacking shore installations and hundred of barges.
- The average monthly consumption of artillery and small arms ammunition doubled during 1966; consumption of mortar ammunition increased 86%.
- B-52 strikes in South Vietnam increased from an average of 150 a month in June 1965 to an average of 425 a month in 1966. As B-52s are moved from Guam to Thailand, the raids may be expected to increase, due to the closeness of target areas.
- The League of Red Cross Societies stated December 23, 1966 that, according to official statistics, there were 1,507,088 displaced Vietnamese at the end of October, of which 820,791 were considered resettled and 686,297 were awaiting resettlement.

(For citation and more detail, see "Escalation of American Involvement in Vietnam in 1966," Friends Committee on National Legislation, February 1967.)

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THERE ARE MANY NEW AREAS
OF ESCALATION
INTO WHICH THE UNITED STATES
MAY BE DRAWN

All of the following have been seriously proposed for Vietnam; they give some indication of what may lie ahead if escalation continues indefinitely:

- Bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. Breach of the dikes north of Hanoi in flood season could lead to hundreds of thousands of deaths from drowning and starvation.
- Massive use of regroupment camps. The forced resettlement of mass populations has already started with the Delta offensive and could, as in Algeria, uproot millions

of people from their traditional homes in the hope of breaking their connections with the guerrillas.

- Blockade of North Vietnam. Danger of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and other powers would be courted by such a blockade, which has frequently been urged.
- Mining Haiphong Harbor. Rivers in North Vietnam already have been mined; Haiphong Harbor may be next.
- Saturation bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.
- Massive troop increases. The United States increased its number of troops in Vietnam over eight-fold in less than two years; many have suggested increases to 600,000, 1,000,000, or even 2,000,000 men.
- Sealing of the demilitarized zone at the "provisional military demarcation line" between North and South Vietnam. This venture, which would take enormous quantities of men and material, has been discussed favorably by Ambassador Lodge and others.
- Sending troops to invade North Vietnam. This has been proposed by Marshal Ky.
- Attack on China. This is the ultimate logical conclusion of viewing the source of materiel as the source of aggression. Some have argued also that it is better to have a war with China now than when she develops her nuclear weapons capacity.
- Use of nuclear weapons. The specter of the possible use of nuclear weapons has been raised from time to time even by such eminent persons as Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater and former President Eisenhower, but has been laid to rest so far. There is always the danger, however, that prolonged frustration over the stalemate could bring about a lashing out with nuclear weapons in an effort to achieve "victory."

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Failure of Our Vietnam Policy

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A CONTINUED POLICY
OF MILITARY ESCALATION
HAS FAILED TO ACHIEVE EVEN
U.S. MILITARY OBJECTIVES

In Congressional testimony*, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara outlined the "basic tasks" which flow from our objectives in Vietnam:

- "(1) to support the re-establishment of the authority of the Government of South Vietnam over its territory.
- "(2) to interdict the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
- "(3) to exert pressure on the Government of North Vietnam to cease its direction and support of the insurrection in South Vietnam."

Secretary McNamara's testimony, combined with information provided by reporters and others on the spot, gives an index of how effective the U.S. escalation policy has been in achieving these goals.

*Secretary McNamara testified January 23, 1967 on the Fiscal Year 1967 Supplemental Appropriation for Southeast Asia before a joint session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations. He gave essentially the same statement February 2, 1967 to the House Armed Services Committee. Unless otherwise noted, references to Secretary McNamara's testimony refer to this source.

GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY HAS NOT BEEN REESTABLISHED

According to Secretary McNamara, "we have found that it is very difficult to clear, completely and permanently, any area in which the Viet Cong guerrillas were once well established. Even around Danang, where the U.S. Marines have been conducting clear-and-secure operations for some 18 months, guerrilla hit-and-run attacks still occur."

Assistant Managing Editor Harrison Salisbury of THE NEW YORK TIMES, summing up after his visit to Hanoi, wrote "although rosy expectations of major victories against the Americans have not been fulfilled, the (National Liberation) Front says that in 1966 it actually extended its territorial sway over larger areas than in 1965 -- a claim that some neutral observers believe is pretty well founded. The Americans have conducted some effective 'spoiling' operations in the South, but when they are completed the control of the territory drifts back into the hands of the Viet Cong." - THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 18, 1967.

The immensity of the task confronting the United States was noted by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in a story in the December 5, 1966 NEW YORK TIMES, in which it was reported that "the Ambassador estimated that there were 150,000 Vietcong terrorists in civilian clothes in South Vietnam, including 20,000 in Saigon. Pacification, he said, will involve elaborate police precautions, a thorough census, identity cards and systematic curfews. He said such a program would require 'city and village governments that can support the police function, and you won't get this until we've rebuilt the whole political, social and economic structure in this country.' "

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BOMBING OF THE NORTH HAS NOT STOPPED INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES

According to Secretary McNamara's testimony a minimum of 48,000 men infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in 1966. But "the number of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam appears to have leveled off in the second half of 1966, and the strength in December was about the same as in June, between 45,000 and 50,000."

On February 15, THE WASHINGTON POST reported that Secretary McNamara in his Congressional appearances opposed an expansion of the bombing on the grounds it is relatively ineffective in reducing the flow of troops from North to South Vietnam. He is said to have testified in closed session: "Undoubtedly the bombings do limit the capability of the North Vietnamese to infiltrate men and equipment into the South. But it is not clear that the limit that results is below the level that the North Vietnamese planned on. In any event, it is not below the level necessary to support the force in the South at the present time. I don't believe that the bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I could contemplate in the future would significantly reduce, actual flow of men and materiel to the South." (Emphasis added.)

Earlier, Secretary McNamara had testified as to the general ineffectiveness of efforts to cut off supplies to the South: "Most of the war material sent from North Vietnam to South Vietnam is provided by other Communist countries, and no amount of destruction of the industrial capacity of North Vietnam can, by itself, eliminate this flow. Our air attacks on North Vietnam petroleum resources have destroyed two-thirds of its storage capacity, but, as I pointed out to this Committee last year the North Vietnamese could and have brought in petroleum 'over the beach' and have stored it at widely dispersed locations. Although we have taken a toll of this flow of supply, shortages of petroleum products do not appear as yet to have greatly impeded the North Vietnamese war effort."

Harrison Salisbury from Hanoi verified the problems Secretary McNamara described with regard to U.S. bombing of National Route 1 and the railroad running alongside it: "The railroad and highway have been bombed again and again, but it is doubtful that rail traffic has ever been held up more than a few hours, and the highway seems capable of operating almost continuously regardless of how many bombs are dropped. . . . "The results of American bombing of the route are readily visible -- particularly in small villages and hamlets along the route. They have suffered severely, often being almost obliterated. But the effect on transportation has been minimal." THE NEW YORK TIMES December 27, 1966.

There is the additional important but unanswerable question of how much U.S. military equipment shipped to Vietnam finds its way into NLF and North Vietnamese hands.

NORTH VIETNAM HAS NOT BEEN PERSUADED TO END ITS SUPPORT OF THE INSURGENTS IN THE SOUTH

There is no question that American bombing has resulted in major destruction for North Vietnam. Salisbury reports, "Whatever the explanation, one can see that United States planes are dropping an enormous weight of explosives on purely civilian targets." - THE NEW YORK TIMES, December 26, 1966. "It is apparent that most American bombs are falling in mud and villages, on dirt roads, on rice fields or around gun sites that are more often set in fields than in towns." THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 13, 1967.

But there is no convincing evidence that this has adversely affected North Vietnam's will to persist. In fact, U.S. bombing has seemed to harden attitudes and unite the North Vietnamese people. According to Harrison Salisbury's reports in THE NEW YORK TIMES:

The populace (of North Vietnam) has been aroused to a state of solidarity that represents a formidable asset for a country struggling against a foe many times more powerful in material means and techniques....

It is generally believed by non-Communist diplomats in Hanoi, rightly or wrongly, that American bombing in the North not only has strengthened the regime in its conviction that the Americans aim at its destruction but also has crystallized a national spirit of patriotism and self-defense that gives the country a united aspect in standing against the United States regardless of how some citizens may privately feel on the question of Communism. (January 18, 1967.)

Foreigners in Hanoi believe the North Vietnamese when they say they are prepared to sacrifice Hanoi, Haiphong, all their cities and towns, rather than yield under American bomb power. (January 12, 1967.)

The basic question would seem to be: Has all this hurt the North Vietnamese so much that they are ready to quit? Their answer is, 'By no means!' And they say that they expect their task to get a lot harder before it gets easier. (January 1, 1967.)

It has long been argued that military force is no solution to the problems of Vietnam. Events bear out this judgment. This massive U.S. military intervention has failed to achieve the major military objectives, and has made Vietnam's complicated political, economic and social problems infinitely more difficult to resolve.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM HAS BECOME AN OPEN-ENDED QUAGMIRE

Early in 1966, Senators Mansfield, Aiken, and others, in their report "The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow" (January 6, 1966), warned, "if present trends continue, there is no assurance as to what ultimate increase in American military commitment will be required before the conflict is terminated. For the fact is that under present terms of reference and as the war has evolved, the question is not one of applying increased U.S. pressure to a defined military situation but rather of pressing against a military situation which is, in effect, open ended."

After a huge increase in manpower, firepower, and level of combat, the United States finds itself in precisely the situation against which Mansfield cautioned. In his State of the Union Message, January 10, 1967, President Johnson said, "I wish I could report to you that the conflict is almost over. This I cannot do. We face more cost, more loss, and more agony. For the end is not yet. I cannot promise you that it will come this year -- or the next. Our adversary still believes he can go on fighting longer than we and our allies are prepared to resist him."

Two years ago or even one year ago it was possible to believe that a massive introduction of American military force into Vietnam might provide a basis for finding a solution to our problems there. Experience since then makes it clear, however, that, like the man fighting with the tar baby, each blow not only makes the situation stickier, but makes extrication more and more difficult.

THE UNITED STATES IS BEING DRAWN DEEPER INTO A GUERRILLA WAR THAT IS A TRAP

Secretary McNamara testified to Congressional committees, "The Free World forces have won every major battle since their

commitment in South Vietnam, and I believe it has been conclusively demonstrated that the Viet Cong main force units are simply not capable of winning any major battle against U.S. forces."

United States, South Vietnamese, and other "Free World" men under arms total more than 1, 135,000, including 455,000 U.S. troops. Arrayed against this force are in estimated 292,000 Vietnamese insurgents, including some 45,000 North Vietnamese regulars.

But this four-to-one superiority, while it is capable of winning major battles, has not succeeded and is not likely to succeed in dealing with the problem of guerrilla warfare. As Secretary McNamara testified:

(In clear and secure operations, designed to seize and hold territory permanently,) our progress has not been satisfactory. The military problem in this type of operation is to eliminate the Viet Cong guerrilla forces. These are, for the most part, local groups whose mission is harrassment, sabotage, and the terrorizing of the local population, as well as the provision of intelligence, terrain guidance, supplies and recruits for main force units. Only when these local guerrilla forces are brought under control can the full range of revolutionary development (i. e., pacification) be undertaken on a permanent basis.

Our own experience, e. g., the U.S. Marines in the First Corps area, has demonstrated that clearing and securing is a very slow and painstaking process, and that a military presence must be maintained for a considerable period of time after the area has been initially 'cleared.' In fact, we have found that it is very difficult to clear, completely and permanently, any area in which the Viet Cong guerrillas were once well established. . . .

But the ultimate success of our entire effort in South Vietnam will turn on the ability of the Government to re-establish its authority over its territory so that peaceful reconstruction can be undertaken. No matter how well the search-and-destroy operations are performed, they

cannot substitute over the long run for the successful accomplishment of the clear-and-secure effort.

How successful has been that effort? Early in 1966, Senator Mansfield reported that in general, "what the Saigon government held in the way of terrain in the early months of 1965 (and it was already considerably less than was held at the time of the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem) is still held. What was controlled then by the Vietcong is still controlled by the Vietcong. What lay between was contested at the outset of 1965 and is still contested." (January 6, 1966.)

As far as the populace is concerned, Premier Ky estimated in November 1965 that his government controlled about 25% of the population, in the sense that this number could vote in an election without fear of coercion or intimidation. Secretary McNamara in January 1966 estimated that under a looser definition of "control" Saigon exercised varying degrees of control over about 52 or 53% of the population. (Senate hearings on 1966 Vietnam Supplemental Appropriation.) In mid-1967 it was estimated that the Viet Cong controlled "at least 50 percent of the territory, and 40 percent of the population - and even more when the sun is down." ("The War in Vietnam," GOP Policy Committee Staff Paper.)

The U.S. difficulty in fighting a guerrilla war is explained by two British experts. Sir Robert Thompson, head of the British Advisory Mission in South Vietnam, formerly Secretary for Defense in Malaya and the author of Defeating Communist Insurgency, wrote:

Time is the key to Giap's present strategy in Vietnam. He now knows that he cannot defeat the United States forces militarily and certainly not in a war of movement within Vietnam. He must, therefore, let time do his work for him.

The battles of the last two years have been a perfect example of this. By maintaining high-scale guerrilla warfare he has traded manpower for space and time at, so far, an acceptable cost. In assessing cost there is an unfortunate tendency to compute insurgent losses optimistically in terms relevant only to a Western industrialized democratic society.

The 50,000 Vietcong killed in 1966 were only a fraction of one year's age group, where all are subject to the draft. Two or three hundred thousand deployed to repair bomb damage to communications and services in North Vietnam are only a small part of the male, and female, labor force which could be made available without damaging the war effort (for example, infiltration has steadily increased). Revolutionary war is very cheap in terms of material and production in a society which only has to exist to breed. . . .

If South Vietnam is to win, the country must in the end be restored as politically and administratively stable and economically expanding, capable of standing on its own feet.

That alone is winning and will inevitably take time -- 10, 15, or even 20 years. . . .

- THE WASHINGTON POST, January 22, 1967, Outlook Section, Page 1.

How were the guerrillas able to hold out and even expand control against the overwhelming firepower and manpower of South Vietnam and its allies? As another British student of guerrilla warfare, Eric Hobsbawn, has written:

Such forces . . . have proved themselves extraordinarily formidable. At their best they simply cannot be defeated by orthodox military operations. Even when less successful, they can be defeated, according to the calculations of British counterinsurgency experts in Malaya and elsewhere, only by a minimum of 10 men on the ground for every single guerrilla. . . . orthodox military methods are quite beside the point: bombs don't work unless there is something other than paddies to make craters in. (NATION, July 19, 1965.)

In Malaysia, again according to Robert Thompson, at the beginning of the "Emergency" the 21,000 government troops had a five-to-one superiority over the armed Communist terrorists. By the early '50's the ratio had increased to about twelve to one.

This gives some indication of what may be in store if current American military objectives in Vietnam are continued.

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THE VIETNAM WAR IS BOGGING THE UNITED STATES DOWN IN THAT "LAND WAR IN ASIA" AGAINST WHICH U.S. MILITARY LEADERS HAVE CONSISTENTLY WARNED

Such a war is clearly not in the best interests of the United States. It contradicts traditional American policy. It pits us against overwhelming numerical odds, with a supply line reaching halfway around the world, fighting where our action can only bring back memories of the days of the white man's domination.

When asked by Senators in 1951 if he had said, "Anybody who commits the land power of the United States on the continent of Asia ought to have his head examined," General Douglas MacArthur replied, "I don't know whether I made the statement, but I confirm absolutely the sentiments involved." (Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, May 1951, page 156.)

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THE CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION OF MASSIVE AMERICAN PRESENCE CREATES SUPPORT FOR NLF ANTI-AMERICANISM

As Ward Just wrote January 23, 1967 in THE WASHINGTON POST, "Anti-Americanism in Vietnam, particularly in the cities, is growing. . . the heavy weight of the American presence and 'advisory effort,' which has become in fact a parallel government reaching down farther into Vietnamese society, is producing a new colonialism different in character but often similar in effect to the French." As the war continues and escalates, we can only expect increased resentment against the hundreds of thousands of foreigners who live like princes according to Vietnamese standards. A tragic sidelight is suggested by the estimate of the surgeon's office of the U.S. Military Command in Vietnam that 66,142 cases of venereal disease among U.S. troops were treated from November 1965 to November 1966, about one out of five of the average number of U.S. troops in the country through that time.

Further, the large number of foreign troops, taking over more and more of the governmental and police as military functions, tends to confirm the NLF argument that theirs is a nationalist war against a foreign invader.

Thus, the continued escalation of American involvement in the war strengthens the very forces that feed the insurgency.

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EXPANSION OF THE WAR MAKES
FURTHER RUSSIAN AND CHINESE
INVOLVEMENT
EVER MORE LIKELY

Russia, China, and several other Communist nations have offered to send "volunteers" to assist North Vietnam whenever they are requested; so far North Vietnam has not asked that such volunteers come to her aid. In fact, there are volunteers in several Communist countries who are eager to go; one Russian was even reported to have immolated himself in protest because he couldn't go.

Harrison Salisbury reported, on the basis of his talks in Hanoi, that North Vietnam was prepared to call in volunteers in the event of a major U.S. escalation of the war. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 18, 1967.)

The commitment of troops from other Communist countries would set in motion an almost inexorable process in which the prestige and power of China and the Soviet Union would be committed to victory in Vietnam.

There is much evidence that Chinese leaders already believe that the Vietnam war is an opening salvo in a war against China. Each increase in American commitment in Vietnam increases China's sense of being threatened by a hostile army building up near her borders. In Korea, it was the threat of a hostile army approaching her borders that brought China directly into the Korean war. There is no reason to believe that at some point in the buildup of American forces China may not decide that "it is better to fight now in Vietnam than later in China" and commit herself directly in Vietnam.

The United States has looked to three factors to discourage Russian and Chinese involvement in Vietnam: Russian desire for a detente with the West, domestic turmoil in China, and Soviet-Chinese conflict. But as the Vietnam war continues, it tends to "unlock" these safety catches against the progression from a local to a world war.

□ The Vietnam war undermines the basis for detente between Russia and the West. As Senator Fulbright wrote in The Arrogance of Power: "If positions were reversed, if the Russians were conducting daily bombing raids against an American ally, it is just about inconceivable that we would confine ourselves to providing equipment to the country under attack." As the war continues, Russia will see less and less common interest between itself and the United States, and the pressures toward a reactivation of militancy will mount. There is too little recognition in the United States of the pressures in the Soviet Union to do more to aid the people of North Vietnam, who are seen as under unjustified attack.

□ So far China has remained preoccupied in internal conflict. But there is little evidence that any of the contending factions regard the United States with anything but hostility. Further, the Vietnam war offers Chinese leaders an opportunity to solve their internal quarrels by means of foreign adventures, a political ploy well honored in revolutionary history since the time of the French Revolution.

□ The Chinese-Soviet conflict forces Russia and China to compete for leadership of the world Communist movement. This creates a situation in which each must demonstrate its willingness and ability to aid Communist countries against the West. This very competition, then, limits the freedom of Russia and China to let America go its own way in Vietnam, but rather tends to draw them into the conflict, in order to prove their readiness to help an ally under attack.

□ There have been widespread reports of a Russian-Chinese agreement to expedite shipment of Russian material across China to North Vietnam, and other indications of willingness to cooperate with the North Vietnamese and each other.

□ Additionally, the Soviet Union has warned that sinking Soviet ships in North Vietnam by the U.S. would lead to their arming the North Vietnamese with both short-and-long-range ground-to-ground missiles.

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THE VIETNAM WAR
HAS WON THE UNITED STATES
NO POPULAR SUPPORT ABROAD
BUT HAS DEPLETED
THE RESERVOIR OF GOODWILL
TOWARD AMERICA EVERYWHERE

The United States' allies have given little military support to this war, despite strong U.S. promptings. The only outside powers with combat troops in South Vietnam are the United States, South Korea and Australia. Thailand, New Zealand and the Philippines only have small numbers of "support troops."

Although the United States says it is supporting freedom in Southeast Asia, only one Southeast Asian mainland country, Thailand, supports our military operations in Vietnam, and it does not send combat troops. (Latest Pentagon statements indicate that 1,000 Thai combat "volunteers" are now present.)

South Korea -- totally dependent on the United States for its own defense -- is the only non-white country in all of Asia, or for that matter the world, with combat troops in South Vietnam. The great non-Communist Asian powers -- India, Pakistan, Japan, Indonesia, Burma -- do not support U.S. military policy in Vietnam; yet these five Asian countries which oppose our policies have 15 times as many people as the two Asian countries, South Korea and Australia, which have supported our effort with combat troops.

Even SEATO members France and Pakistan do not approve of U.S. actions in Vietnam. According to Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, "part of our problem in South East Asia is that we are white people killing people of color, and this is not helping us in terms of any understanding of our position in Asia." (C.B.S., "Face the Nation," December 25, 1966.)

This liquidation of the goodwill the United States has retained from its postwar championing of independence for many Asian nations is similarly illustrated by a statement in the respected Economic Weekly of Bombay that "The people in Asia -- and elsewhere -- have a right to ask of the U.S. Government why it is involving them in this awesome risk. If the U.S. reply is

that they feel insecure with each spread of communist hegemony even if it be ten thousand miles away from home, the answer of the people of Asia... will continue to be that they are scarcely interested in accepting martyrhood merely to satisfy the security psychosis of the United States' citizens." (March 13, 1965.)

In The Arrogance of Power Senator Fulbright wrote, "One detects in Europe a growing uneasiness about American policy, a feeling that the United States is becoming unreliable and that it may be better -- safer, that is -- to keep the Americans at a distance. One detects in the French withdrawal from NATO a great deal more than General de Gaulle's idiosyncrasies; the French action may be representative of a widespread loss of European confidence in American policy and judgment."

According to Senator Fulbright, this "Vietnam fallout" is not limited to Europe. "I would guess that many a European or Asian or African or Latin American looking at America today feels overawed rather than reassured by our tremendous power... far from being reassured by the uses of American military power in Vietnam, by the spectacle of American bombs falling on Vietnamese jungles and villages in a volume equal to that of the bombing of Germany's great industrial cities at the height of World War II, our friends abroad may be puzzled both by the destructiveness of American power and its apparent ineffectiveness. It is possible that the violence and inconclusiveness of the war have raised doubts in many minds abroad as to whether it is not worse to be saved than to be abandoned by the United States."

In contrast to the Korean War, this war has not won the support of the United Nations. In fact, not only has the United Nations not endorsed American policy or participated in it, but the majority of its members probably oppose that policy.

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AMERICA'S COMMITMENT
TO THE MILITARY DEFENSE
OF SOUTH VIETNAM
IS TENUOUS AT BEST

It is often asserted that America is committed to defend the Vietnamese and that this commitment has been stated by three Presidents and by the Senate in the SEATO treaty. But as

Arthur Larson, former Director of the U.S. Information Agency, wrote, "The true fact is that the United States has had no obligation to South Vietnam or anyone else under the SEATO treaty to use its own armed forces in the defense of South Vietnam. . . . If one examines the major documents, speeches, press conferences, and communiques bearing on this subject since 1950, it is a curious fact that one cannot find the words 'commitment,' 'obligation,' or 'pledge' used to describe our relations to South Vietnam until the Johnson Administration." (Vietnam and Beyond, 1965.)

When John Foster Dulles, who negotiated the SEATO treaty for the United States, was asked by Senator Theodore F. Green of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 11, 1954) whether the United States would be obliged by the SEATO treaty to help put down a revolutionary movement, Mr. Dulles said, "No. If there is a revolutionary movement in Vietnam. . . we have no undertaking to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult together as to what to do about it." (Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 1954, page 28.)

And Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, one of the two U.S. Senators to accompany Mr. Dulles to the treaty conference in Manila, explained that some nations had intended to establish "an organization modeled on the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements. . . . Such an organization might have required the commitment of American ground forces to the Asian mainland. We carefully avoided any possible implication regarding an arrangement of that kind." (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 1053, February 1, 1955.)

Assertions that America has a "solemn pledge" to defend South Vietnam have most often been based on a letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem, October 23, 1954. But careful examination of this letter reveals no commitment to the defense of South Vietnam. As Arthur Larson wrote, "The nearest thing to a commitment at this stage was an indicated willingness, subject to some stiff (and as yet unsatisfied) conditions and understandings, to provide economic and technical assistance, including military advisers, material and training." And if any credibility remained to this letter as a basis for claiming an American

"commitment" to the military defense of Vietnam, it was dispelled August 17, 1965 by President Eisenhower himself. "We said we would help that country," he said; "we were not talking about military programs, but about aid." (THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 18, 1965.)

See also "The War in Vietnam", prepared by the Senate Republican Policy Committee Staff.

The Vietnam war has become increasingly a U.S. military, political and economic undertaking on behalf of the South Vietnamese government. Whatever the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam was, it clearly did not contemplate this result.

As President Kennedy said on September 2, 1963, "In the final analysis, it is their (the Vietnamese) war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it -- the people of Vietnam -- against the Communists."

And as Senator Mansfield and others reported to the President, February 25, 1963, "The role of the United States is supplementary, advisory, and perhaps exhortatory, but it is not, in the end, controlling. . ." ("Vietnam and Southeast Asia.")

Yet the Americanization of the war -- against which President Kennedy and Senator Mansfield warned and to which the United States had never clearly committed itself -- is exactly what we are now embarked on.

By October 1966 the number of American troops in Vietnam had surpassed the number of men in South Vietnam's regular army, indicating the extent to which the United States is bearing the brunt of the war. In his testimony on the 1967 Supplemental Appropriation, Secretary McNamara gave an indication of how much further this process has gone: "It has been agreed by all the parties concerned that the main weight of the effort of the South Vietnamese armed forces should be placed on clear-and-secure operations," that is, operations "designed to hold territory." Thus, the South Vietnamese army has ceased playing a major role in the offensive battle against the opposition.

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THE CURRENT LEVEL OF WAR
FAR EXCEEDS ANYTHING
REASONABLY ANTICIPATED WHEN
THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION
WAS RUSHED THROUGH CONGRESS
IN AUGUST 1964

This resolution, authorizing the President "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression," has been used to justify the massive commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam. Yet Senator Fulbright said, while acting as floor manager for the bill in August 1964, "I personally feel it would be very unwise under any circumstances to put a large land army on the Asian Continent." (Congressional Record, August 6, 1964, page 17823.)

Senator Gaylord A. Nelson of Wisconsin proposed an amendment to the resolution which said in part: "Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid direct military involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict." Senator Fulbright did not accept the amendment because it would require a Conference with the House and cause delay, but he said, "The Senator has put in his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjectionable. . . I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements." (Congressional Record, August 7, 1964, page 17873.)

Five months after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, there were still only 23,000 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam -- only 6,500 more than at the beginning of 1964. Even in May 1965 -- nine months after the resolution -- there were still fewer than 50,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. "At that time the American force was still basically an advisory organization. Americans, in regular combat units, were not yet engaged on the ground. U.S. helicopter companies were in use but only to supply tactical transportation to regular Vietnamese units, and the U.S. jet fighter-bombers in the country with the exception of two or three squadrons of aircraft were not yet engaged in support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces." ("Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow," Senators

Mansfield, Aiken et al., page 2.) In all of 1964 there were only 147 American deaths from hostile action in Vietnam.

Thus, there are currently about 20 times as many American military personnel in South Vietnam as there were at the time of the Tonkin resolution. The American force has now become the main fighting force in South Vietnam, while the South Vietnamese Army is no longer even playing a central part in offensive "search-and-destroy" operations.

It is very difficult to believe that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution supports the major undeclared land war now being carried on on the Asian mainland.

U.S. "PROTECTION"

As Martha Gellhorn wrote in the Ladies Home Journal (January 1967), "American weapons are killing and wounding uncounted Vietnamese children. Not 10 or 20 children, which would be tragedy enough, but hundreds killed and many more hundreds wounded every month. This terrible act is officially ignored: No Government agency keeps statistics on the civilians of all ages, from babies to the very old, killed and wounded in South Vietnam. I have witnessed modern war in nine countries, but I have never seen a war like the one in South Vietnam.

"... There are 77 orphanages in South Vietnam and 80,000 registered orphans. (Another figure is 110,000.) No one can tell how many orphaned children have been adopted by relatives... the estimated increase in orphans is 2,000 a month.

"... Close air support for infantry in combat zones is one thing. The day and night bombing of hamlets, filled with women, children and the old, is another. Bombs are mass destroyers. The military targets among the peasants -- the Viet Cong -- are small, fast-moving individuals. Bombs cannot identify them. Impartially, they mangle children, who are numerous, and guerrilla fighters, who are few."

THE VIETNAM WAR
IS DESTROYING
THE NATION AND PEOPLE
OF VIETNAM

The forced movement of whole villages; the destruction of massive areas of the countryside; the burning of villages and attacks on populated areas believed to harbor Viet Cong -- these tactics tend to validate the NLF argument that the Americans are making war on the people of Vietnam.

According to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, "The Vietnamese people, in particular, have known no peace for a quarter of a century. Their present plight should be the first, and not the last, consideration. . . . the basic problem is not one of ideology but one of national identity and survival. . . . The survival of the people of Vietnam must be seen as the real issue. . . ." (Introduction to Annual Report, September 15, 1966.)

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THE MASSIVE AMERICAN
MILITARY OPERATION IN VIETNAM
IS NOT A NECESSARY
OR EFFECTIVE WAY
TO PREVENT
THE ADVANCE OF COMMUNISM
IN ASIA

John Kenneth Galbraith, former Ambassador to India, testified (April 25, 1966) before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ". . . the so-called domino theory, which I don't hold for a moment, . . . is the kind of over-simplified thinking by formula which . . . has been most damaging in our foreign policy. . . . One of the errors of the cold war mystique has been to assume that the whole world is equally susceptible to communism; this is nonsense. Wherever one has great social injustice, . . . and if there is no good hope of change, then sooner or later there will be a response to the promise of communism. . . . On the other hand, . . . (where) there are widely distributed landholdings, or there are tribal landholdings. . . the problem of such a highly organized system as communism or socialism is too formidable. It just isn't going to happen."

Even if the South Vietnamese were to go communist, there is little reason for assuming that the rest of Southeast Asia would

follow them. Many people, from the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee to the Secretary-General of the U.N., have criticized the "domino theory" as an over-simplification. Each of the nations of Southeast Asia will have its future governed by its own interests, its own nationalism, its own leadership and political philosophy -- and it is centrally important to realize that Vietnam is the only country in this entire area where the nationalist movement which won independence from colonial power was communist-led and dominated.

On the other hand, as Bernard Fall wrote in Foreign Affairs, October 1966, "There is no more reason to believe that a free-world 'victory in Vietnam' is going to deter other revolutionary guerrilla wars than there was to have hoped that the Kaiser's defeat in World War I would teach Nazism a useful lesson in 1938; or to have expected that Communist guerrilla setbacks in Greece . . . would 'teach' guerrillas something in Cuba. . . . If it 'teaches' them anything at all, it may well be this: that unless the local regime undertakes a measure of true reforms, even the hugest military power in the world can be successfully stalemated for a long period of time by lightly-armed peasant guerrillas and the infantry in a tiny underdeveloped country."

Further, U. S. activities in Vietnam may themselves arouse sympathy for the small underdeveloped state of North Vietnam, while destroying the world's goodwill and support for America. This creates a "domino effect" of its own, in which individual citizens of Canada, Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa become disillusioned with the United States as a competent world leader. When what are taken as the fruits of our form of government are seen in the skies over Vietnam and in its bombed-out villages, we should hardly be surprised to find citizens and governments of the world losing their faith in democracy.

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THE VIETNAM WAR UNDERCUTS
THE MOST BASIC
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

According to President Johnson, one of our national foreign policy objectives now is to end the cold war with the Soviet Union. Yet the effect of the Vietnam war has been to make us enemies across the battlefield, and to put a freeze on any attempts toward easing relations elsewhere.

The Vietnam war is a major factor in the current crisis in NATO. De Gaulle has stated that a part of his reason for disengaging France from NATO is the desire not to be connected with American adventures in Asia. Germans and others have worried that increasing focus by the United States on Asia represents a decreasing commitment to Europe.

At a time of great upheaval in China, a huge U.S. military presence close to her borders is likely to strengthen the belligerent, hard-line forces internally rather than the more moderate elements.

America as a world leader sets an important example by its conduct. What kind of example does it set by its actions in Vietnam? It is discouraging the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is encouraging the use of mass violence in resolving international conflicts. It is emphasizing unilateral rather than multi-lateral action. It is undercutting respect for international law. It is setting an example of a great nation using its overwhelming military and political strength against a smaller one.

America recognizes that its long-range security can only rest in the building of a peaceful, lawful world. Yet this war undermines all attempts to build such a world.

The United States has weakened the United Nations, first, by not following its obligations under the Charter to solve its dispute by peaceful means and to join in international rather than unilateral actions to prevent aggression; second, by refusing to follow the advice of the Secretary-General on how to achieve negotiations, and turning aside his offers to help achieve a cease-fire.

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Public Opposition Grows

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PUBLIC DISAFFECTION WITH VIETNAM WAR POLICY IS GROWING

The following examples illustrate increasing doubt about the course the present Administration is following:

- Business Executives in an open letter to the President in The Washington Post, February 8, 1967, protested escalation of the war in Vietnam and urged (1) cessation of bombing; (2) reduction of military activities; and (3) negotiation with all parties now fighting. It was signed by 174 business executives, including 89 presidents or board chairmen. The appeal appeared again May 28 in The New York Times, this time with 307 signatures.
- Student Body Presidents and Campus Editors from more than 100 colleges and universities (The New York Times, December 30, 1966) questioned whether "America's vital interests are sufficiently threatened in Vietnam to necessitate the growing commitment there" and whether "a war which may devastate much of the countryside can lead to the stable and prosperous Vietnam we once hoped our presence would help create." They warned: "Unless this conflict can be eased, the United States will find some of her most loyal and courageous young people choosing to go to jail rather than to bear their country's arms."
- Clergymen and Laymen of various religious faiths from all parts of the country went to Washington to protest American policy and to urge their representatives in Washington to vote against the Vietnam Supplemental Appropriation and otherwise demonstrate their opposition to war. More than 2,000 participated in the January 31-February 1, 1967, effort.
- On February 8, 1967, Former Peace Corps Volunteers and others who worked in similar programs urged halting of the bombing of North Vietnam, acceptance of direct

participation of the National Liberation Front in peace negotiations, and discontinuing the present military build-up with a view toward the disengagement of all foreign forces from Vietnam. Their letter to the President was signed by over 400.

- College and University Faculty Members by the thousands have published ads and held teach-ins. Over 5,000 college faculty members and 1,000 persons from other professions joined in an appeal on January 15 and 22, 1967, in THE NEW YORK TIMES saying, "Mr. President: Stop the Bombing."
- Rhodes Scholars addressed a letter to President Johnson and to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, himself a former Rhodes Scholar, saying they found that their "feelings of conscience and national obligation counsel skepticism and concern, not active support, of the Government's Vietnam policy." The letter was signed by 50 of the 68 Rhodes Scholars. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 27, 1967.)
- Architects, Engineers, Planners and other members of the design professions, in an open letter to the President, urged an immediate cease-fire, with negotiations on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, with all parties including the National Liberation Front represented. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 22, 1967.) The letter was signed by over 300.
- Professors, Preachers, Labor Leaders and concerned citizens marched in New York (as many as 300,000) and San Francisco (75,000-100,000) on April 15, 1967 in a Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam. They gathered by auto, bus, plane and train from all over the nation, and they marched for hours to make their protest seen and heard. Over 100 young men burned their draft cards in Central Park before the New York march began.
- Members of Health Professions presented a petition against the war to the Administration containing more than 5000 signatures. (WASHINGTON STAR, March 23, 1967)

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THE WORLD'S RELIGIOUS LEADERS ARE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM

- Pope Paul VI said September 19, 1966, "We cry to them in God's name to stop. Men must come together and work out concrete plans and terms in all sincerity. A settlement should be reached now, even at the expense of some inconvenience or loss, for it may have to be made later in the train of bitter slaughter and involve greater loss."
- The National Council of Churches stated, December 1965, "We believe that war in this nuclear age settles hardly anything and may destroy everything. . . . We believe that if the United States follows a unilateral policy in Vietnam, no conceivable victory there can compensate for the distrust and hatred of the United States that is being generated each day throughout much of the world because we are seen as a predominantly white nation using our overwhelming military strength to kill more and more Asians." In December 1966, the General Assembly of the National Council of Churches in a study document called for the placing of the Vietnam issue on the United Nations agenda and urged the Administration to show more candor in its statements about Vietnam and to give serious consideration to a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam "even though there may be no advance assurance of reciprocal action by the North Vietnamese Government."

And in June, 1967, in a statement adopted by the General Board, it said: "We propose that the U.S. simultaneously stop the bombing of the North and seek collective, international judgment and action through the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations or other means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. . . . It appears to us now that the bombing of the North is a block to negotiations. We therefore ask the U.S. Government to stop this bombing, simultaneously with its submission of issues to the U.N. General Assembly or other international agency."

- Three Presidents of the International Red Cross on May 22, 1967 called upon all the warring parties to conclude with the utmost urgency a complete and comprehensive cease-

fire in all areas in order that this intolerable burden of human misery may be removed from the civilian populations of Viet Nam."

- The Synagogue Council of America said in January 1966, "Along with Americans of all faiths, we confront with deep sorrow the loss of American and Vietnamese lives, both North and South, and the suffering of the civilian population in that agonized and war-torn country. Our religious conscience compels us to exert every influence so that the action in Vietnam can be moved from the battlefield to the negotiating table."
- The President of the Catholic Association for International Peace, Dr. William V. O'Brien, also director of the Institute of World Polity at Georgetown University, stated that the bombing raids on North Vietnam "come dangerously close to the category of direct attacks on population centers. Such attacks on population centers are morally impermissible. . . . Certainly raids such as those conducted on December 13 and 14, 1966, in or near Hanoi should not be repeated." (THE NEW YORK TIMES, December 31, 1966.)
- Fifteen Protestant, Catholic and Jewish groups joined together early in 1967 in a joint program, "Vietnam: Challenge to the Conscience of America" of public education and Congressional interviewing on the Vietnam war.
- The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and a long-time fighter for civil rights, threw the full weight of his prestige behind the struggle to end U. S. involvement in Vietnam, saying, "I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without first having spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today - my own government." (THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 5, 1967.)
- Unitarian Universalist Ministers signed a New York Times ad May 28, 1967, "bearing their solemn testimony" against the American war in Vietnam. More than 250 signers were listed.

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IN THE PAST
THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT
DONE ALL IT COULD
TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS

- A. According to Robert H. Estabrook, correspondent for The Washington Post, in a February 4, 1967 front page story, "North Vietnam definitely agreed last December to an American suggestion for direct discussions toward settling the war" according to "a highly authoritative Western source. . . . The arrangements went so far as to specify Warsaw as the locale of the talks. But after the American bombing raids near Hanoi December 13 and 14 -- which Hanoi charged damaged civilian areas -- North Vietnam withdrew its agreement, accusing the United States of bad faith."

U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and the Polish representative on the International Control Commission were apparently both involved in this. Mr. Estabrook reports: "On or about December 4 a reply came from Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki stating that Hanoi had agreed to talks at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw. North Vietnam asked that special representatives be dispatched from Washington for the purpose.

"Hanoi reportedly attached no conditions about a prior cessation of American bombing of North Vietnam to its agreement."

- B. Before and during the Tet (Lunar New Year) truce in February 1967, there were many hints and reports of negotiating possibilities. One of the clear indications of a move to the conference table would have been an "unconditional" end of the bombing of North Vietnam. During the truce, Secretary of State Rusk seemed to harden the United States negotiating position by indicating that an appropriate response by North Vietnam to a U.S. end of its bombing would be to stop sending North Vietnamese men and supplies to the South rather than merely indicating a readiness to go to the conference table, which had earlier seemed sufficient.

After President Johnson had temporarily extended the bombing pause just before the United States announced resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam on February 13, 1967, United Nations Secretary General U Thant issued a statement saying "Non-resumption of the bombing is a wise move. If it means cessation

of bombing, then I believe that meaningful talks will take place within a few weeks." The Washington Post reported, February 14: "U.N. sources said the Secretary-General's statement was based on firm information, not speculation. U.N. officials were stunned by the Pentagon announcement that followed, but said later that the Secretary-General was standing on his statement."

C. These are only the most recent of a series of opportunities to pursue negotiations which have been missed by the United States. According to Eric Sevareid in "The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson": "In the early autumn of 1964... U Thant, U.N. Secretary-General, had privately obtained agreement from authorities in North Vietnam that they would send an emissary to talk with an American emissary in Rangoon, Burma. Someone in Washington insisted that this attempt be postponed until after the Presidential election. When the election was over, U Thant again pursued the matter; Hanoi was still willing to send its man. But Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Adlai went on, flatly opposed the attempt. . .

"Time was passing, the war expanding. The pressures on U Thant... were mounting from all sides within the U.N. So he proposed an outright cease-fire, with a truce line to be drawn across not only Vietnam but neighboring Laos. U Thant then made a remarkable suggestion: United States officials could write the terms of the cease-fire offer, exactly as they saw fit, and he, U Thant, would announce it in exactly those words. Again, so Stevenson said to me, McNamara turned this down, and from Secretary Rusk there was no response, to Stevenson's knowledge."

D. According to Philippe Devillers, Director of Southeast Asia Studies at the University of Paris, "Still another approach was made through France in February 1965. M. Couve de Murville went to Washington to inform the government that both France and the U.S.S.R. felt that the time was propitious for a conference and were ready to work for it"; Hanoi was apparently ready to accept talks, and, according to Devillers, the Chinese had indicated they would not object. But the only U.S. response to this information was to continue to bomb North Vietnam.

Nor were these the only times that movement toward peace was disrupted by American military escalation of the war. A re-

cent Citizens' White Paper, The Politics of Escalation, by Schurmann, Scott and Zelnik, submitted to the President over the names of many leading Americans including Eugene Carson Blake, Marriner S. Eccles and Jacob J. Weinstein, concluded: "A study of the chronology of American escalations within the political context reveals... that the major American intensifications of the war have been preceded less by substantially increased military opposition than by periods of mounting pressure for a political settlement of the war... The most disturbing finding of this study is thus the pattern in which moves toward political settlement are brought to a close with an intensification of the war by the United States."

To take just two examples of their findings: "In the week of July 23, 1964, U Thant, President de Gaulle, and the Soviet Government all called for a Geneva conference. In the week of August 2, the United States made its first overt attack on ships and territory of North Vietnam." And later, "Efforts of Italian intermediaries La Pire and Fanfani in November and December of 1965 were followed on December 15 by the first bombing of the Haiphong area, which the Administration had been told would close the door to negotiations."

Equally important, the United States has not even tried the course suggested by U Thant in his "three points." Yet Thant and many other world leaders who have held discussions with both sides are convinced that cessation of bombing of North Vietnam, a scaling down of hostilities by both sides, and a willingness to hold discussions with all parties to the conflict are minimum conditions for initiating peace talks.

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THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES TO THE POLICY OF CONTINUED ESCALATION

In fact, there have been a great many proposals by people such as President Charles de Gaulle, President Sihanouk of Cambodia, Senator Joseph Clark, Senator Claiborne Pell, Senator J. W. Fulbright, Senator Wayne Morse, Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, and many others, of which the following are just a few:

□ Unconditionally halt the bombing of North Vietnam, and cease all offensive operations in South Vietnam, stating

U.S. willingness to negotiate with all parties including the National Liberation Front, as urged by U.N. Secretary-General U Thant and endorsed by a number of U.S. Senators.

- Urge the South Vietnamese Government, the Buddhists, and other major political groups in South Vietnam to enter negotiations with the National Liberation Front making continued American support of the Saigon Government contingent upon the seriousness of such efforts.
- Propose a military cease-fire among the four main belligerents: United States, South Vietnam, National Liberation Front, and North Vietnam.
- Make the neutralization of North and South Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia, guaranteed by the great powers, the objective of U.S. policy.
- Press for verified free elections, open to all candidates and all voters, in South Vietnam, as urged by Senator Claiborne Pell.
- Request that an independent peace force -- U.N., Afro-Asian, an expanded International Control Commission, or other -- take responsibility for the Vietnam situation, providing for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel and free elections.

(See also "Neutralization in S. E. Asia - Problems and Prospects," a study prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 10, 1966; and "Viet Nam in the Balance," by Bernard B. Fall, Foreign Affairs, October 1966, pages 17 - 18.)

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THE VIETNAM WAR
MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST
OTHER NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The period to 1970 is a "make or break" period in at least five areas. If rapid strides are not made toward solutions in this period, each of these situations may become so unmanageable that it can be corrected only at great human cost and suffering. These areas are as follows:

- ending poverty and healing our growing racial and economic antagonisms here in the United States;

- solving the threat of world-wide hunger and famine which sober analysts are clearly predicting;
- reducing the explosive population growth to manageable proportions;
- closing the dangerously widening gap between the developed and the less developed nations;
- bringing the increasingly critical arms race under control.

Progress toward the solution of every one of these problems is being seriously impeded by the Vietnam war. Every one of them requires large sums of money, trained manpower, organizational talent and applied intelligence to solve it. Most of that time, energy and money is now going into the Vietnam war. We see the war's effects graphically in cuts in important domestic and foreign programs, in diversion of many of the best brains and resources of the country to finding new ways to carry on the war.

Meanwhile, the problems multiply, the ghettos become more crowded, and dissatisfaction rises at home and abroad. The war creates an atmosphere in which right wing extremism feeds and grows, making solutions doubly difficult.

According to figures in the President's 1967 Budget Message there would be a \$16 billion surplus this fiscal year if the United States were not fighting the Vietnam war. The projected surplus would be even larger in fiscal 1968. Think what it would mean to the United States and the world to spend this money for constructive rather than destructive purposes.

□
THE BEST WAY
TO SUPPORT AMERICAN BOYS
IN VIETNAM
IS TO END THE WAR
AND BRING THEM HOME

In the words of Senator Mansfield, "We owe an unremitting search for a peaceful solution in Vietnam to the young Americans who have gone and who will go to that tortured land." Continuing escalation makes any final, peaceful settlement in Vietnam ever more difficult. It raises the specter of American youth sacrific-

ing the next decade in an interminable guerrilla war in support of a people unwilling to fight for their own freedom. It increases the possibility of "volunteers" being sent to Vietnam from China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist countries, and the development of a great-power conflict in which thousands of American boys would be killed in a war nobody wanted.

In squandering the resources of our own society, we weaken the chance for freedom and a good life for the young men fighting in Vietnam. We let them down by spending over \$2 billion a month on the Vietnamese war instead of building a U.S. society where they and their families can live decently -- in good neighborhoods not ghettos, in good homes not slums, with a good education and good health.

We also need to ask what it will do to our boys to keep them in Vietnam. U.S. soldiers in Vietnam are fighting in a land where a large part of the populace is hostile and the local army uncommitted. The situation requires them to napalm women and children, entomb people in mountain caves, force villagers by the thousands to leave their homes and the graves of their ancestors -- all in support of a corrupt and unrepresentative government in Saigon. Most can't tell friend from foe. They dispense aid with one hand and death with the other. They have become, in the words of Robert Sherrod, a "Foreign Legion." Is it for this that our boys need our support?

We are letting our boys down right now: by enlarging again and again the scope of conflict; by wasting their lives in a brutal and unnecessary war; by failing to pursue all possibilities for a peaceful conclusion of hostilities.

The only policy which does not let our boys down is one which will take all possible steps to end the war and bring them home.

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