


AFSC Recovery Pilot Program for Urban Haiti.

A. Current Situation.

1. The January 12th, 7.2 magnitude earthquake leveled Port-au-Prince (PaP), leaving more than 1.7 million people without a roof over their heads. The scale of the PaP's destruction, exacerbated by poor urban planning, high population density, and a lack of national disaster preparedness, arguably makes the January 12 earthquake one of the **worst urban disasters at the beginning of the century**.
2. Striking the capital city, the centralized seat of political, economic and judicial power in the country, it devastated Haiti's physical and human infrastructure, and placed even greater strain on the government's already limited ability to offer citizen services.
3. Over 600 thousand city dwellers left the city to seek safety in the provinces, but are likely to return if assistance and basic services, as well as access to food and jobs, are not timely provided.



4. In the first months following the crisis, officials estimated 1.2 million Haitians had become displaced. In early April 2010, revised figures placed the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) living in settlements across Haiti at over 2 million.
5. Areas most affected by the earthquake, its aftershocks and the displacement of people are: Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, Léogâne, Petit Goave, Grand Goave and Gressier. Almost half of Port-au-Prince's population of 1.7 million is living in 1,325 spontaneous settlements.
6. Settlements in the city are overcrowded, sanitation is limited and, in some cases, they lack any assistance at all, even in conspicuous places like the camp on the Mausolée National, located at the side block of the National Palace.

7. The location, size, layout and design of a settlement have an important impact on the health, well being, protection and access to assistance of the displaced population (Camp Management Toolkit, 2008).
8. Port-au –Prince shelters can be classified as follows:
 - (a) **Homes.** Some affected people whose houses were damaged by the earthquake are still living on their property, but in tents outside the house. Also, some affected people whose homes were damaged by the earthquake are living on others’ property – neighbor, relative or friend.
 - (b) **Settlements:**
 - b1. **Spontaneous, small, middle size settlements in affected areas** (less than 5,000 persons)living near their original homes on public or private property. This category could be considered ‘neighborhood settlements’ since they are close to their place of origin and there is a relative familiarity between members of the group. They could be former property owners, renters or squatters.
 - b2. **Large, spontaneous, settlements in affected areas** (more than 5,000 persons).These sites have a great likelihood of becoming permanent. Reducing population size would help avoid conflicts developing within the settlement and with surrounding communities. The settlements are likely to face issues of sanitation and access to basic services.



b3. Small/mid-size, spontaneous, settlements in open areas. These citizens live outside in an open space on public or private property (in fields, parks, abandoned grounds) with others with whom they most likely do not have a prior relationship. The social fabric of these settlements will be weak. Members could be former renters and squatters whose housing was affected by the earthquake but they may also be citizens in difficult economic situations.

b4. Large, spontaneous settlements in open areas. Settlements are considered 'large' due to population size (more than 5,000 persons) and not necessarily available space. Shelter conditions are inconsistent and are a mixture of tents, tarpaulins, blankets, etc.

b5. Transitional settlements sites. These government planned sites provide full services infrastructure, including water supply, food distribution, nonfood item distribution, education, and health care, (usually exclusively for the population of the site).

9. The government of Haiti has been against the idea of large camps for fear of their permanence. They have produced a "Safer Shelter Strategy" that includes five options:
 - (a) Returning to their homes if they are safe;
 - (b) returning to a safe plot;
 - (c) staying temporarily with a host family;
 - (d) staying temporarily in an existing site; and
 - (e) Temporary relocation to planned sites.
10. The diversity of the people in the camps overarches the social spectrum of Haiti, and you can find people with no education living under a tent next door to a highly educated professional. People from all social classes (besides the elite) can be found in camps, living together and sharing this disaster and its consequences.
11. Coordination of and conditions in the camps are appalling. The nature of the shelters (ranging from tents and tarpaulins to blankets and cardboard) offers little physical protection from the elements, and there are reports of sexual violence in the settlements.
12. Three months after the earthquake, the UN suddenly identified double the number of sites, displaced person's registration efforts were ad hoc or inexistent, and coordination and communication between the UN, international NGOs (INGOs), the Government of Haiti and local civil society is greatly lacking.
13. INGOs are failing to capitalize on the knowledge and work outreach of municipal or community stakeholders and logistical, capacity and linguistic obstacles, to name a few, prevent local organizations from engaging with the UN's Cluster set-up.

B. Potential for Violence

14. Natural disasters aggravate existing patterns of discrimination and power imbalances within a society. In a post-disaster situation, the notion of vulnerability depends on national, cultural, and environmental factors including a population's ability (or lack thereof) to adapt to change in their environment. In the short and long-term, disasters impact segments of the population disproportionately, with the disabled and elderly, the poor, women, children, and other marginalized groups often the worst affected.
15. In the wake of disasters, studies and anecdotal evidence strongly suggest a high prevalence of intimate partner violence, child abuse and sexual violence as well as increased levels of crime and community violence in the long-term (WHO, 2005).
16. Evidence also indicates that mental health issues (such as post-traumatic stress disorder), the scarcity of basic provisions, destruction of social networks, breakdown of law enforcement, cessation of community support programs, and disruptions to the economy combine to make the post-disaster environment increasingly isolating and more conducive to violence (WHO, 2005).
17. Evaluating the impact of the Port-au-Prince earthquake from a gendered perspective, women may be more vulnerable after the disaster due to links between increased rates of sexual assault and domestic violence following disasters.
18. People with disabilities are another group who become more vulnerable in wake of natural disasters. While a disaster can disproportionately affect people with existing disabilities, it also has the potential to generate disabilities in individuals who previously did not have them. In the context of the earthquake in Haiti, injuries have been so severe or badly infected that people continue to lose limbs.
19. Mentally and physically disabled persons have traditionally been ostracized in Haiti. People with disabilities are often kept hidden because they are considered to reflect poorly on their family and in some cases; their disability is deemed to be a punishment from god.
20. Special attention should be paid to the situation of Restavec children, who are also left more vulnerable after the earthquake. From the French "stay with", it is a Haitian tradition by which impoverished parents will give a child to a more affluent family in order to serve as a domestic servant. In exchange for the help, children are expected to receive lodging, food, clothing, and an education.
21. Under general circumstances, Restavec children are more vulnerable to beatings, sexual assaults and other abuses by host families, and are often turned out on the street once they are older. After the destruction of houses and the relocation of families in the earthquake, acceptance of future Restavec children may decrease and social ties supporting current ones may break down. As a result, Haiti, and in particular urban settings, could see a sharp increase in the number of unemployed and homeless children.

22. In addition to the situation described above, the probability of increasing conflict, and even violence, is very high due to general elections (presidential, municipal and legislative) taking place by the end of the year 2010: politics have always been a factor in conflict and violence, due to high levels of political patronage and intimidation.

C. AFSC Intervention Rationale

23. One of the greatest impacts of the earthquake for most Haitians has been the loss of their homes. It is estimated that well over 105,000 houses were destroyed and 208,000 damaged. In total, nearly 1.7 million people face displacement or homelessness due to the earthquake. Shelter is one of the most basic and essential needs.

24. Shelter in cities should be a central component in an overall recovery plan that fosters Haitian self-sufficiency; given that 90 % of the Haitian population lives in four cities. Specific to the current situation, policy-makers should enable families to return to homes that are structurally sound, develop programs to help families fix homes that can be repaired, and plan for the reintegration of many families whose homes have been destroyed and who inevitably will want to return to be near family, community and livelihoods.

25. While agriculture development is certainly important, 70% of Haiti's GDP is urban-generated. There must be recognition that shelter will be needed most in the affected communities where permanent and lasting jobs/income will be available, and people's strong ties to their families and communities must be supported.

26. Further, there is a risk that response following the 12 January 2010 earthquake may aggravate existing patterns of discrimination and power imbalances within Haitian society. The significant human and material losses suffered by the Haitian National Police and UN peacekeepers have left a void in security, while the displacement of almost half of the capital's population in overcrowded settlements, the uncoordinated distribution of aid and the upcoming raining season and national presidential elections increase tensions and indicate the possibility of an urban crisis. The post-disaster environment is also particularly vulnerable to the spread of organized criminality.

27. Therefore, it is recommended that AFSC target those that are more likely to be displaced for a longer period of time, because populations in these settlements are more vulnerable, and could become prey to conflict and violence. In this sense, citizens staying in their own property or staying with host households will eventually be relocated faster than the other categories.

28. For the rest of the cases, an evaluation should be made on a case to case basis to determine whether the displacement is going to be lengthy or not, because the situation in the camps is more complicated, taking into account different aspects related to ownership of the land (private or public), location in high risk areas, large populations, relation with local communities/authorities, etc.



29. There is ample agreement that people housed in temporary shelters in affected areas as well in open areas are confronting a number of problems:
- (a) most camps still have not constituted a local beneficiaries committees to coordinate help and communication with the municipal authorities, international agencies, Haitian National Police, etc ;
 - (b) in the camps, there is no full periodic or regular registration of possible newcomers, to secure food/tent/water planning and distribution;
 - (c) camps lack a physical central reference point where the inhabitants can go to for information and services like provision of births and death certificates, etc;
 - (d) Most of the camps have no physical place to provide cultural and learning activities to youth and children.
 - (e) There is no procedure for confidentiality for women reporting on possible sexual offenses
 - (f) Privacy for the elderly and disabled to report on specific needs or security for adult males reporting possible extortion and food distribution malpractices.
30. The situations described above call for AFSC to play a role in helping those who suffer while confirming AFSC's own "niche", based on: (a) our long standing presence in the country, working where others are not; (b) our institutional experience in humanitarian relief (Mitch, Tsunami, etc); and (c) our conceptual and practical know-how on urban violence and conflict transformation developed in Latin America during the last three years.

D. AFSC Entry Points

31. In order to facilitate an entry point for AFSC's work with affected urban communities in Haiti, the two pilot scenarios suggested will share some common features: (a) the implementation of a Camp Center in each targeted camp in the first 12 months of the pilot program; (b) a programmatic focus on prevention/reduction of possible camp violence (in their different forms) through psycho-social healing and mediation training; and (c) AFSC working in partnership with a local Haitian (public/private) entity.
32. Re: the Camp Center (a large tent), it will provide a **safe space** for people to carry out cultural activities, host coordination meetings with different actors, carry out training workshops on different subjects (conflict mediation/resolution, planning, security, etc.), discuss violence cases and prevention mechanisms, and so on.
33. The Camp Centers will act as a beehive for the communities in the camps, and their use could fill a series of functions that are currently not being addressed by other actors intervening in the emergency.
34. These Camp Centers will secure a presence in the camps, hence allowing AFSC and its partner to move to subsequent actions depending on the developments that take place in the shelter i.e. people moving from a spontaneous shelter to transitional one; or evolving from a single camp into an upgraded transitional shelter, etc.
35. The recent mission visit to Haiti confirmed Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) as a key factor affecting in different degrees large segments of the urban population. Fear and insecurity is reflected in people's refusal to sleep in houses, although they were not affected by the earthquake, as well increasing need for representation/verbalization of traumatic experiences. Children and adults coping with fear resulting from homeless and violent experiences could make use of a number of practical strategies (story-telling, art therapy, spiritual healing, etc) already used in other AFSC international disaster response experiences.
36. PTSD is also associated with a possible increase of cases of domestic violence, especially against children, and sexual abuse against women. The fact that a large number of camps are inhabited by mono-parental (female) households makes the hypothesis a relevant one.
37. Further, it might be expected that juvenile violence will start to take shape in the different camps for a number of reasons: (a) infiltration or simply co-habitation of young gang members in the camps; (b) physical violence among adolescents resulting from food, sexual or territorial conflicts; (c) political rivalry during the upcoming presidential campaign.
38. Finally, male adult violence can also be expected. The current Food for Work and Cash for Work reaching up to 79,000 persons it is clearly not enough. Most of the camp population will be involved in the informal economy when possible (depending on camp location, transport facilities and their specific trade), but it is almost sure that a segment will turn to unlawful practices, especially given that the Haitian National Police is under staffed and underequipped.


39. Following the earthquake, Haitian and international authorities feared resurgence in violence, especially with the escape of over 4,000 prisoners. Heavy losses sustained by the police and UN peacekeepers, combined with an early focus on disaster relief left a temporary security void in Port-au-Prince.
40. The Haitian National Police now has about 2,000 officers covering the city. Large settlements have a permanent police presence but smaller ones have patrolling officers or none at all. While an increase in the rate of organized crime has not materialized in the streets, the combination of precarious living situations during the upcoming rainy season, and a demographically young displaced population in an urban setting creates fears that an uprising could lead to an urban crisis.
41. The camps inhabitants will therefore need to create a inner camp protection system and it is in their own interest and security that such a group does not develop into a “Vigilante” one. Therefore training on group non-violent response to crisis situation and conflict mediation would really help to enhance camp internal harmony and reduction of possible violent confrontations.
42. Finally, the planning mission confirmed the relevance of a pilot intervention program being implemented by a Haitian entity where AFSC provides technical support on specific issues. In response to the crisis, local capacities have been disregarded by most international NGOs. Once Haiti was labeled a “failed state”, its own capacities were seen as non-existent and “good” solutions needed to come from outside. This influx combined with a lack of coordination of activities presents another risk that the Government of Haiti will be further incapacitated.

E. Scenarios

43. Scenario # 1. Pilot program (12 months) on **Conflict Mediation and Psycho-Social Coping** in two middle size camps/affected/open areas in **Port-au-Prince**. The potential partner would be the Nationale Commission Episcopale Nationale Justice et Paix, which has over the last years been implementing several peace building processes at the community level in the city. Justice and Peace Commission is working on 5 strategic lines which are all of interest of AFSC: Human Rights Observation, Training in Human Rights, Peace Building, Accompanying Victims and Justice Reform.
44. Another potential partner in Port-au-Prince could be the Brazilian-Haitian Viva Rio organization, which specializes in urban youth at risk. Present in the Bel Air area (128.000 inhabitants) since 2005, Viva Rio is implementing a combination of humanitarian relief with community peace practices in three local camps.
45. As already stated, the project will install a Camp Center (a large tent) that should function as a camp **Safe Space**. In agreement with the local partner, AFSC will provide financial and technical resources to set up both tents, train local partner staff on conflict mediation/resolution and help in the development of a project monitoring system.
46. The pilot project should provide quality information to better learn the dynamics of the middle size camps as well people’s own mechanisms and local capacities to manage conflicts and

reduce violence. The project should also translate into Creole existing practical manuals to reduce Post Traumatic Stress Disorders and help train a given number of camps inhabitants/ local NGO staff on coping techniques. AFSC current network in Guatemala, Mexico and USA (AFSC Chicago Office) could provide relevant experience and information on those subjects.

47. After 12 months, a joint AFSC-local partner assessment on camp/shelter developments as well on project achievements will define possible future cooperation.
48. Scenario # 2. Pilot Program (12 months) on **Improving Citizen Security in Leogane City** in two middle size camps in affected areas.



49. Leogane is a port city 29 km from Port-au-Prince with 80/90 % of their buildings damaged/destroyed by the earthquake resulting in 30.000 deaths. The mission paid a one day visit to the city, meet with the mayor, Save the Children and 30 camp coordinators. During the meeting with the latter they reported that their camps lack tents, food and security.

50. The specific objective for this scenario based in Leogane will focus on addressing psychosocial problems to reduce violent behavior, while strengthening the communities' capacities to manage security in the camps, to prevent violence and boost their capacities to participate in the long-term process of reconstruction along with all actors involved in this phase.
51. The anchor for this scenario could be an institution rooted at the local level, with a lengthy presence in this commune, in order to make sure that they are well established in the area, they are familiar with the conflict dimensions before and after the earthquake, and they are well accepted by the communities, both displaced and non-displaced. The mission discussed the issue with the local mayor (fluently in English after 18 years living in New York), who suggested a joint endeavor AFSC- Municipality.
52. The mayor envisions AFSC helping the Municipality to set up a strategic planning unit which will coordinate the humanitarian work with all other international NGOs operating in Leogane, design a municipal urban development plan, security management in the camps, community-based psychosocial assistance, violence prevention mechanisms and creating capacities of community leaders to ensure that they will be able to better participate in the reconstruction process.
53. Similar to the Port-au-Prince scenario, this 12 months pilot project will start with the setting up of a Camp Center (Safe Space) for operational purposes, while building Municipal capacities to plan and implement a strategic unit to develop an urban sustainable plan which include the people living in the camps and their surroundings.

End report.